Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait by Richard C. Bush. Washington: Brookings
Institution Press, 2005. $24.95, 416 pp.
With much of my academic studies focused on the European
continent and its history of conflict and integration, I have not spent much
time examining the central issues facing East Asia and the Pacific area. Living
in the middle of the Pacific has helped hone my interest however, and I have
been particularly focused as of late on the Taiwan Strait conflict. The subject
is particularly applicable in the Marshall Islands, which recognizes Taiwan as
the Republic of China. For a deeper look at this issue then, I turned to
Richard Bush, who has been heavily involved in Taiwan-China issues for over two
decades and who has the academic and policy background to properly
contextualize the conflict.
The Taiwan Strait conflict strikes at the very heart of
Westphalian sovereignty and security. Who represents China? Who has the right
to declare independence and under what circumstances? When can a country
respond militarily to a perceived threat? When Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic
of China government fled mainland China in 1949, it was as if two parallel
historical narratives were created. The communists and Mao Zedong had de
facto rule of all of mainland China and
acted accordingly. The Nationalists and their successors on Taiwan continued to
claim de jure sovereignty over
all of China. These competing claims continued apace but essentially reversed
themselves: today, the Republic of China has de facto rule of the island of Taiwan while the People’s
Republic of China claims de jure
sovereignty. Who is right?
As the title suggests, the issues surrounding this conflict
are complicated and yield no easy answers. Both political rhetoric and military
resources plays an extremely important role. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC) sees the question of international recognition at the core of its
domestic legitimacy and will aggressively fight against any international role
for Taiwan. Some of the most volatile flash points in the conflict have arisen
from comments made by Taiwan leaders suggesting they have or will seek full
independence. On the other side, the military buildup by China and the
continuing sale of arms by the United States to Taiwan puts real firepower
behind the rhetoric. For now, both sides have agreed to a tenuous truce, but
the lack of trust, communication, and progress is frightening. The possibility
of war is real.
Richard Bush writes well and is comprehensive in his
examination. Drawing from his own experience serving as the Chairman of the
American Institute in Taiwan from 1997 to 2002 and through a close examination
of the major strands of the Gordian knot, he effectively conveys the
seriousness of this situation for all parties concerned, especially the U.S.
The Taiwan Strait conflict is not currently a major theme in current events,
and for that we should be grateful. But if and when the situation escalates, I
sincerely hope that cooler heads, such as Richard Bush, will prevail and be
able to guide policymakers through the intricacies of cross-strait relations.
There are only three faults with the book, none of which can
be directly attributed to the author. First, the book was finished in 2005,
just as Chen Shui-bian won a second term as President of Taiwan. While Bush
does a good job examining how his reelection will impact relations, I feel that
if he had waited perhaps one more year he would have been able to provide a
little more contemporary context for the new detente between the PRC and
Taiwan. Of course, I cannot imagine any author sitting on a book for one year,
and really the responsibility rests with the reader to take the book’s broad
narrative and examine current events in that light. Second, the view of the conflict
is in sharper focus from Taiwan’s perspective than from mainland China’s
perspective. Bush himself acknowledges that he places much of the blame for
current tensions at the feet of the PRC and is not surreptitious in his bias,
understandable given his professional background. The existing governance
structure of mainland China makes it further difficult to gather the full
details about what is going on in the minds of communist leaders. Given these
handicaps, Bush does a decent job exploring the conflict from the perspective
of communist China.
Finally, the author fails to provide one quick punchy
solution for resolving the conflict. In an age of talking heads and quick
opinions, the lack of a comprehensive policy prescription is notable. He
explores ideas such as iterative reciprocal agreements to escape the existing
prisoner’s dilemma and institutional development, but ultimately throws up his
hands and says, essentially, “Someone has to go first.” For now, we remain in a
stable status quo. But when change comes, I sincerely hope the leaders involved
can take the same measured and comprehensive approach this book does.

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