The 9/11 Commission Report

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Authorized Edition). New York: W.W. Norton And Company, Inc., 2004. 567 pp., $10.00. [Full PDF also available here.]

In the first day of consular training, every officer is handed a copy of this book and told to become familiar with the recommendations from the Commission and apply the insights gained. One day at lunch, I sat out in the courtyard and casually opened to the first chapter. I barely made it back in time before the next training session started. From the first chapter, this report provides a very compelling and riveting narrative of the events of September 11, 2001. Placing the terrorist attacks firmly within a broad historical narrative while also providing a detailed breakdown of the sequence of events, this book should be a must-read for any politician or even lay person wishing to make casual reference to "9/11" to support their argument. 

After opening the book by detailing the minute-by-minute narrative of the events of September 11, the Commission investigates the inauspicious beginnings of al Qaeda and the U.S. response thereto. The Commission also exhaustively reviews counterterrorism strategies, border security, and emergency response practices existing by 2001. While no one person or organization is "responsible," the overarching sense is that no one connected the dots. Or as the Commission puts it, "a failure of imagination" led to 9/11. Clues emerged in the years prior, concerns about al Qaeda were everywhere, but without an integrated and aggressive effort by national intelligence organizations, dismantling a small transnational terrorist organization operating on a modest budget and with little technical training is remarkably difficult.

The U.S. counterterrorism strategy is reactive. This was true before 9/11 and it remains true today. Organizations are always focused on the last great threat or the last great war. As such, we fail to appreciate new threats or attempt to think outside the box. A major aspect of this failure is the public. Repeatedly, leaders chose not to attack threats in Afghanistan and elsewhere for fear of public reprisals. The reality is that while a catastrophic failure in national defense will immediately impact the public perception, thwarting attacks are rarely heralded. Nor do they win elections.

Combined with my work perspective, this book is illuminating. The past decade has been dramatically shaped by the events of 9/11. And honestly, I truly believe we have changed policies such that another 9/11 will not happen. Our border security is integrated and, while not perfect, very rigorous. (Concerns remain about our land borders however.) Air traffic security and management is significantly improved. And most importantly, the country is aware of the threat. Perhaps too aware. 

How prepared are we for new and different types of threats? Al Qaeda may very well be waning; its founder is dead, leadership has been decimated and there is very little room for safe havens these days. But what about the threat of a nuclear Pakistan? What about a nuclear Saudi Arabia? What about the public perception battle currently underway in the Islamic world? I will not try to name the myriad threats or concerns our country may face. My point--and I believe the major theme of this report--is that a broader and more comprehensive national debate is needed. Somehow, as a country we need to see the  forest through the trees, we need to be more proactive in shaping our future, we need to live with faith in the institutions of our country rather than in fear of yesterday's enemy.