Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990. 307 p., $16.50.
Somehow, in all my studies I have avoided reading this foundational book in international relations. I have of course heard references to Joseph Nye throughout and myself used the term "soft power" constantly. So, in a fit of realism, I decided to go back and read this book thoroughly to see what Nye had to say about power in the 20th century. And frankly, Nye's insights are prescient, innovative, and interesting even after almost two decades.
What is the nature of power in international relations? That has been a foundational question since the days of Greece. Without becoming too mired in political science jargon, Nye focuses squarely on both instruments of power and power conversion. Diplomats have long fretted about the balance of power and the means of creating a stable international system. The rise of the UK and the US seemed to demonstrate that the world was safest and most stable with a superpower hegemon that enforced the rules. But the author doubts both the viability of the theory and its applicability to Britain or the US. This book further argues that the tools used in international stability are changing. Military force is less convertible, more risky, and bears higher costs.
Nye deals squarely with the school of American declinism, which was going through a strong revival at the time of his writing. America's golden age as a superpower was likely exaggerated after the fact, since America was never overly dominant in the international system. Nye also points to the significant leads in innovative technology in the US, the structural deficiencies that were just beginning to become apparent in the Soviet Union and the hyperbole surrounding the rise of Japan. Although America's relative power may have declined somewhat, there was clearly no one who could honestly contest America's role as the leading power.
Twenty years after the books publication, Nye appears vindicated in nearly his entire analysis. I suppose that is why his material continues to be cited to this day. Fears of a Japanese takeover appear comical now, though it does shed some light on the current anti-Chinese warmongering. And in a world of Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Boeing (I will avoid Citi and GM for the time being), the economic dominance of the United States remains viable and visible.
Despite the books strengths, I find that it has shaken my faith in the political science community. There is a real problem of small sample size in subject matter such as this. After all, how many hegemons have there been in a modern age? How can we truly make generalizable statements about international stability when we generally only discuss a period dating back to 1945? Political science seems less relevant than political analysis where examiners draw upon historical facts to discuss possible implications for the present without pretending to have predictive power. Perhaps that is the true political science after all.

